刘保山,关旭(外),Yulan Wang(外) Supplier Encroachment with Multiple Retailers.

我校经济管理学院刘保山老师在T3级别期刊——《Production and Operations Management》上发表题为“Supplier Encroachment with Multiple Retailers”。论文第一作者刘保山为经济管理学院特任副教授。

Abstract / 摘要：

MT 在这项研究中，我们调查了供应商的侵占激励时，它分发产品通过多个零售商。我们表明，注册下游零售商的数量在决定供应商的侵占激励和渠道成员的绩效中起着关键作用。存在一个关于下游零售商数量的阈值，低于该阈值，现有文献中记录的供应商侵占的光明面就存在；也就是说，侵占行为不仅能使侵占供应商本身受益，也能使零售商受益。然而，当下游零售商的数量超过这一门槛值时，进一步加剧的下游竞争削弱了由供应商侵占引起的批发价格降低的影响。供应商的侵占总是对零售商不利。此外，随着零售商数量的增加，供应商可能会变得更糟，当被赋予下游入侵的选择权，即使供应商没有实际执行这一选项。我们进一步研究了供应商的最优市场渗透策略时，它可以招收一个新的零售商或开辟一个直接渠道，或它是昂贵的建立间接渠道。我们表明，当两个销售渠道是不完美的替代品或零售商不对称时，主要结果保持不变。。

原文 In this study, we investigate the supplier's encroachment incentive when it distributes the product through multiple retailers. We show that the number of enrolled downstream retailers plays a pivotal role in determining the supplier's encroachment incentive and the channel members’ performances. There exists a threshold value with respect to the number of downstream retailers, below which the bright side of supplier encroachment documented in the existing literature exists; that is, encroachment can benefit not only the encroaching supplier itself but also the retailers. However, when the number of downstream retailers exceeds this threshold value, the further intensified downstream competition dampens the effect of wholesale price reduction arising from supplier encroachment. Supplier encroachment becomes always detrimental to the retailer. Moreover, with the increasing number of retailers, the supplier may become worse off when being endowed with the option of downstream encroachment, even when the supplier does not actually execute this option. We further investigate the supplier's optimal market penetration strategy when it can enroll a new retailer or open a direct channel, or it is costly to establish the indirect channel. We show that the main results remain qualitatively unchanged when the two selling channels are imperfect substitutes or retailers are asymmetric.

论文信息;

Title/题目:

Supplier Encroachment with Multiple Retailers

Authors/作者:

Liu Baoshan; Guan Xu; Wang Yulan

Key Words / 关键词 ：

supplier encroachment; retailer competition; game theory

Indexed by / 核心评价 ：

INSPEC; SCI; Scopus; WAJCI;

DOI: 10.1111/POMS.13447

全文链接：https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/poms.13447